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There is no statistical evidence that growth was faster - or
slower - for countries that received adjustment loans.  And
there are no signs of sustainable recovery through higher invest-
ment-  at least through 1986.
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1.  Introduction
The decade of the 1980s  will  be remembered as one of unfulfilled
expectations for developing countries.  Average per capita GDP growth fell
from 3.1 percent in the 1970s  to  0.6  percent  in the 1980s, and for  many
countries, private per capita consumption  growth  was negative.  Adjustment
lending programs supported  by the International  Monetary Fund (IMF)  and the
World Bank (WB)  were  launched  in  response  to the deteriorating external
environment. Restoring growth has remainei  the focal concern of adjustment
lending.  Indeed, it is this  greater emphasis on growth that disLinguishes
the adjustment programs of the 1980s  from their predecessors.  The purpose
of this paper is  to  assess  statistically  the extent to which adjustment
programs supported by the IMF and the  WB have restored growth. l/
The  paper  offers  a  fairly  systematic  evaluation  of  :MF-WB
supported adjustment programs.  The evaluation  relies on a large sample of
countries (93)  and  controls  for  some  of  the  statistical difficulties
associated with measuring  the  effectiveness  of  adjustment programs.  In
section 2, we review  briefly  the  environment  under which 1MF-'sB  lendinlg
took place, the rationale for  adjustment  lending, and the distribution of
adjustment loans through time.  The  methodology is described in section 3.
The results of the statistical  evaluation  in section 4 suggest that, after
controlling for external factors  and  for initial conditions, growth is not
higher in countries recipient  of  IMF-WB  Fund  ,  but that investment  was
significantly lower than for non-recipient countries.  This result leads us
to examine further long-term growth prospects  in  section 5.  There, for a2
group  of 15 countrie_  that  received IMF-WB  adjustment  loans,  we estimate  a
simple  growth  model  where  capital is  the  only  binding  factor  on output.
This  model  allows  us to  measure  the  approximate  output  loss  incurred  during
adjustment  programs  due  to  the  combined reduction of  private  and  public
investment.  Conclusions  follow  in section  6.
2.  External  Environment  and  Adjustment  Lending
The  proximate  causes of  the  worsening  performance  of developing
countries  during  the  1980s are  well-known.  For  oil-importing  countri!s,
the foreclosing  of  commercial  credit  and  higher  real interest rates on
co-mmercial  borrowing came on top  of  the  second  oil price shock.  Within
this group of  countries,  exporters  of  primary  commodities  were further
adversely  affected by  declining prices for  primary commodities  as the
dollar  appreciated.  For  oil  exporters,  deterioration  in  the  terms  of trade
came later, but they  were  also  adversely  affected by the foreclosing of
commercial funds.  This adverse  evolution  of the external environment for
developing countries is summarized  in  the  top  of  table 1.  Using these
measures, in table 2 we provide  a  measure of the loss in purchasing power
during 1982-6 due to the unfavourable  environment  of the 1980s.  The loss
is estimated at between 3.8 and 4.5 percentage points of average GDP during
1982-6.
As can be seen from the  macroeconomic indicators in table 2, as a
result of the deteriorating  external environment, developing countries had
difficulty in improving their current  account position during the eighties
and they increased substantially their  external indebtedness.  Also, table
2 indicates that the cut in expenditures that accompanied the adjustment to3
Table  1:  TERMS-OF-TRADE,  REAL  INTEREST  RATES  AND  BORROWING  SOURCES
1980  1981  1982  1903  1984  1955  1988
Change  in  Terms  of  Trade  (%):
Non-Fuel  exporters  -5.8  -4.0  -2.0  0.8  2.6  -2.3  -2.9
Fuel  exports  44.1  11.1  0.3  -8.6  0.7  -2.5  -47.9
Real  interest  rate  a/  4.4  6.5  8.7  5 8  7.0  5.0  5.0
Borrowing  sources
Net  private  borrowing  b/  73.3  72.6  48.9  25.4  14.8  1a.7  2.3
Official  borrowing  (IMF  and  WS)
Number  of  WB  Adjustment  loans  8  8  5  22  10  18  28
(amount  b/)  (0.  )  (0.9)  (0.8)  (3.4)  (1.1)  (2.0)  (3.9)
Number  of  IMF loans  26  32  30  41  30  31  32
(net  IMF  credit  b/)  (2.3)  (4.7)  (3.8)  (9.4)  (4.4)  (0.9)  (-1.4)
Notes: a/ Percent.
b/ Biion  current  dollars.
Sources: World  Bank (1989),  table  2.1,  and  Khan  (1988,  appendix).4
the more unfavourable  external  environment  involved  a  reduction in the
share of investment expenditures in GDP.
It is in response to  these  balance of payments difficulties that
adjustment lending  was  initiated  by  the  WB  (SALs  and SECALs) and that
adjustment  programs  by  the  IMF  (EFFs  and  standby  arrangements) were
intensified. 2/  Participation by these international  agencies was intended
to assist recipient countries in designing packages that would help achieve
two objectives.  First, the  packages  would  help stabilize the economy by
adopting measures to restore  a sustainable  balance between aggregate demand
and aggregate supply.  Second,  the  packages  would help production in the
short-run,  especially  in  tradabl's  because  of  the  need  to  generate
increased  net  foreign  exchanze  earnings  to  meet  'arger  ;ert  service
payments.  In our  companion  paper  (Faini,  et.  al.  1989),  *e  show  that  tnis
objective  was  met by a  significantly  larger  real  exchange  rate  qevauao
for countries that participated in adjustment programs sup.port-  c  by  the  M!F
and  the World  Bank.  As  emphasized  by  Corbo  et  as.  L9  7\  e -. o:e
emphasis of  adjustment  programs  in  the  eighties  waS  he  e,.as  s
restoring long-run  growth,  henrce the  label  g:uw-.:n:  I
programs.
The  distributicn  of  ad'ustment  loans  t3nu  ..-.: ;e  -.
by  the  WB are  given  at  the  bottom  of  table  1.  The  table  ;-.wi -he ￿hRr
drop  in the availability  of  commercial  funds  start  in-.  :.-.  e  e
also  indicates  a sharp,  increase  in  lending  volume  a<-  i  -- e n  er 
loans by both  institutions  starting  in  1983.  Htwevr-,  r  e  a  :un  e
lending by  both  institutions  far  from  com-ensated  a  r  e  ed  r..  4  :
commercial fund  borrowing.  WI.ile  both  institut  ons  pro  'V  e  . ;;_  -5
rable 2:  MACROECONC:0o INDICATORS DURING THE 1980S
1978-81  1982-86
Low  Middle  Low  Middle
Income  income  Income  Income
GDP (Growth)  2.77  4.83  2.48  1.99
CA/GDP  -7.3.7  -5.52  -7.81  -5.12
INVjGDP  20.6  27.1  18.5  22.7
RER  1.029  1.014  1.247  1.040
EXSHCK/GDP a/  -4.50(LY)  -3.82 (MY)
DOD/GDP  33.8  29.3  54.2  46.6
Definitions:
GDP  =  Real gross domestic product
CA  =  Current  account
INV  Real public + private investment
RER  =  Real exchange rate  index  (3980=100).  An  increase irn  the
value of RER means a real depreciation.
DOD  =  Putlic or  publicly  guaranteed  debt  m  World  Bank Debt
tables.
Notes:  Cwn calculations.  All  values  a:-e average  values  during the
relevant period.  Sample  of  93  developing  countries.  LY =  'ow
income; MY =  middle  income.  (Income  per  capita above S450 irn
1986).
a/  Source:  Fain.i  et al. (1989).  Estimate of the welfare loss due to
lower terms of  trade  and  higher  interest  rates during 1982-86
compared with 1978-81, as expressed as a share of t'e average 32P.
Formula for the computation of the  welfare loss is given below
equation 4.6
disbursing  loans,  the  shorter  maturity  of  IMF  loans  implied sharply
diminishing net credit after 1985.
In previous work, we  found  no  correlation between the amount of
IMF-WB adjustment credit during 1982-86  and  the size of the external shock
during that period, suggesting that  adjustment lending was nct targeted to
countries facing the  greatest  deterioration  in the external environment.
However, we  fouid  a  significantly  negative  correlation  between IMF-WB
credit and net private  credit  suggesting  that  IMF-WB credit served as a
substitute for private credit.
3.  An Implementable  Model to  Measure Effectiveness of IMF-WB Programs
3.1  Alternative Approaches to Evaluating Adjustment Programns
The relatively short time period since the beginning of adjustment
lending is a reason  why so  little formal statistical  evidence is available
on performance under these adjustment programs.  Apart from a recent paper
by Khan (1988),  most of  the  available evidence fDonc;an  G1982(,  Coldstein
(1986),  Cornia  et  al  (1987),  Balassa  (1988)]  relies on non-parametric
statistics (e.g. the  number  of  countries  which  show  an im:;rovement  i-
growth in the year  followinrg implementation  of  an.  ad;ustmenrt  program) to
assess perform.ance. Furthermore, often  the samples are sm^Li, making more
difficult the interpretation  of results.
Statistical evaluation  of  adjustment  prog-ams  is  fraught  with
difficulties.  First,  any  assessment  of  pe;-formance  must recognize that
performance will be  influenced  by  the  external  environment.  Countries
under adjustment p.ograms  which faced a more unfavourabie environment wo.'d
be  expected  to  show  less  improvement  in  performance.  Seccrd.  anv
assessment should, to the extent  possible, take into account what polic:es7
would  have  been in  the  absence of  IMF-WB adjustment  programs. Thus  any
'before  and  after' analysis should be  complemented  by  a control  group
approach  to  reduce the  bias  in  the  estimated values  of the  selected
indicators.  These  considerations  are  taken  into  account in  the
simple model  presented  below.  3/
Denote  the  set  of  performance indicators j for  country  i  by yij-
We postulate that changes in  the  value  of  each  performance  indicator
depends  on  a vector  of  autonomous policy changes,  Axi, on  rhanges  in  the
external environment,  SHi, and  possibly on  participation  in  IMF-WB
adjustment  programs:
(1)  hYij  =  aoj  +  Ax! *  ai +  SHi  *  2j  +  CON  *  a3j  +  eij
where  CON  is  a dummy  variable  which  takes  the  value  of 1  for  czuntries  that
received  an IMF  and/or World  Bank  adjustment loan.  Because  autonomous
policy  changes are  unobservable  for  countries participating  in  IMF-WB
programs,  we specify  the  following  rep  ion  function:
(2)  Axi  =  7  * [Yi  d  (Yi l) I  +  Si;
Thus,  autonomous  policies  are specified  as an adjustment process of  th^e
performance  indicators  towards  their  desired  values  (yj). Under  the  long-
run  assumption  (yi  =  yi),  substituting  AX,  the  transpose  cf (2).  into  (1)
gives  the  final  equation  for  estimation:
(3)  Ayij  =  i  oj  +  (Yi)  Pij  +  SHi *  2j  +  CON *  P3j +  Oij8
In this  model,  A  refers to  a  difference  between  the 'post'  and
"pre"  adjustment periods, and  in  the  statistical  results reported  in
section  4, each  observation  is an  average  over  the  pre  and  post  adjustment
periods.
The  assumption that  IMF-WB lending  has  a  fixed effect on
performance  may appear too  restrictive.  Alternatively,  we introduce  in
equation  (3)  the  amount  of net  IMF-"';j  lending  during  1982-6  instead  of the
dummy  variable  CON.  In that  case,  the  maintained  hypothesis  is  that,  after
controlling  for  external  factors  and  autonomous  policy  changes,  the  change
in  performance  is  linearly  related  to the  amount  of IMF-WB  disbursements.
3.2  Implementation
Since  IMF-WB  programs  are  often  not  initiated  in  the same  year,  it
is difficult to choose the  correct  point  for beginning the assessment of
these programs.  The choice  of  1982  as  the cut-off point was made since
1982 corresponds  most closely  to  the  year  when the external environment
deteriorated sharply for developing countries (see table 1). 4/
As detailed in the appendix,  the  sample  consists of data for 93
developing countries.  Among these countries, 32 did not receive any IMF-WB
adjustment loans during 1982-86.  Another 9 - ceived their first adjustment
loan only in 1985 or 1986  which  makes it difficult to assess the impact of
the loan given our data.  Thus,  these countries are added to those who  did
not  receive adjustment loans so  that the  control group  includes  41
countries.  The remaining 52  countries received IMF-WB adjustment lending.
In this group, only  2  countries  received  their first adjustment Loan in
1984.  Hence  one  should  really  interpret  the  statistical  results as
pertaining to  the  performance  of  50  countries which received adjustment9
credits  in  1982 or  1983 and  were  carrying out  policy  reforms  whose
perfr,mance-enhancing  effects  were  supposed to  last  throughout  the  period
of analysis  (i.e. until  1986).  The  performance of these  countries  is
compared  with the  performance  of  43  countries (of  which  11  countries  had
been implementing  adjustment  lending  policy  reforms  since  1984).
Next,  we construct  a proxy  for  the  external  invironiment,  SHi,  by
measuring  terms of  trade and  interest rate shocks.  To  measure  how
signitfiant  the  deterioration  in  the  external  environment  was,  we quantify
the  impact  of the  external disturbances  associated  with  declining  terms  of
trade  and  rising  real  interest rates.  Exterlal  disturbances  are  measured
over  1982-6,  taking  average  values over  1976-81 as the  base  period. The
formula  (country  subscripts  omitted)  is:  5/
(4)  SH  =  - (R,  - R  ) *  (D/Y)  +  (PX  PX  1)  (X/Y) 1
- (PM 2 /PM 1 - 1)  (M/Y)1
where subscripts 2 and 1  refer  to  1982-6,and 1976-81 respectively, a bar
over a variable means an  average  value  over  the relevant period and the
variables are:
R  =  average real interest rate  (deflacor is  USGDP deflator)
and  the  nominal  interest rate  is the  weighted  interest
on concessional and commercial debt.
Y  =  real GDP
PX,PM  =  export  aad  import  price  indices  deflated  by  USGDP
deflator10
X,M  - redl  exports  and  real  imports
D  - gross  outstanding  debt,  net  of reserves
In  equation  4, the  first term  (RIR)  measures  the  contribution  of
higher  than  expected  interest  payments and  the  remaining  terms  measure  the
e.;fect  of changes  in  the  terms  of  trade  (TOT).  The  choice  of  periods
implies  that  the  proxy  for  the  external  environment,  SHi, is  expressed  as  a
nercentage  of the  average  value  of  GDP  during  1976-81.
4.  Statistical  Results
Our  main interest is  in  the  effects of  adjustment  programs  on
growth. We use  two  indicators  of  growth:  GDP  growth  and the  share  of
investment  in  GDP.  It could  be  argued  that  the  investment  share  in  GDP  is
an intermediate  target. While  this would  be  true  in the  long  run,  our
limited  time-frame for  the  post-loan period removes this  concern.  An
improvement  in  growth alone  could  indicate an  increase in  capacity
utilization.  Hence  the  investment  share  is  used  as an additional  indicator
of  sustainable  long-run growth.  We  also  use  two  indicators whose
developments  are followed  closely  by  the  IMF:  inflation  and  the  current
account. (Another  closely watched indicator, the  government  deficit,  .s
not included  here because  it is  unreliable  on  a  comparative  basis.)
The  results after  one  round  of  exclusion of  influential
observations,  and  correcting for heteroskedacity,  appear  in tahle  3. 5/
The  effects of  participation  in  IMF-WB programs are  measured Dy  the
coefficient  on the  dummy  CON.  7/  The  first  remarkable  result  is that
participation  in  IMF-WB  programs  does  not  appear  to affect  output  growth  in11
Table  3:  PERFORMANCE  UNDER  ADJUSTMENT  LENDING
Dependent
Variable  Y_.  I/Y_ 1 CA_ 1 P- 1 SH  CON  F  NOBS
Ay  -. 677  .006  -.134  .010  -. 069  -. 001  28.15  79
(-6.32)  (.17)  (-2.68)  (.46)  (-2.06)  (-.19)
AI/Y  .246  -. 296  .279  -. 047  -. 049  -. 006  10.81  80
(1.67)  (-4.61)  (2.61)  (-2.65)  (-.66)  (-.68)
A;  -.146  -. 072  -.161  .077  .140  +.008  1.42  79
(-.60)  (-.70)  (-.96)  (.68)  (.98)  (+.43)
ACA  .396  .133  -.490  .026  -.068  +.034  13.60  80
(3.00)  (3.07)  (-6.55)  (1.87)  (-.84)  (.4.83)
The  constant  term  is  omitted  from  the results,  and  the  t-statistics  are in  parentheses.
Definition  of variables:  all variables are average values over  1982-6  (e.g.,  y is
average  GDP  growth  during  1982-6). All lagged  values  are  average  values  over  1978-81.
Y = CDP growth; I/Y =  INV/GDP;  CA  =  CA/GDP;  P  is  the  inflation  rate;  SH is the
external shock estimate from  equation 4;  CON  =  dummy variable with  value 1 if
participating  in  IMF  and/or  World  Bank  adjustment  programs;  F =  statistic;  NOBS  = number
of  observations  used  in  regression.
Results  are  corrected  for heteroskedasticity  by  weighing  each  observation  by the inverse
of its  estimated  standard error.  Extreme influential  observations  are  excluded  using
Belsley,  Kuh,  and  Welsch  (1980)  criteria  outlined in  the  Appendix.  The list  of  excluded
countries  are  given  in  table  A.2  of  the  appendix.12
a significant  manner,  after  having  controlled  for  the  negative  influence  of
external  shocks.  We  also find  that adjustment lending  is  positively
correlated  with the  current  account performance.  These  results  echo  those
in  Khan (1988) where  countries that participated in  Fund  programs  had
significantly  lower  output  growth  in the  first  year after  the  inception  of
the  program, but  this negative effect appeared to  diminish  when  Khan
allowed  the  effects  of Fund  programs to  last  two  years. Khan  also  found
that  countries  participating  in  Fund  programs  had  a significant  improvement
in  their  current  account.  The  fact that we measure  performance  over  a
three  to five  year  period  (depending  on  when the  country  received  its  first
adjustment  loan)  may  therefore account for  our  finding  an insignificant
effect  of Bank-Fund  participation  on growth.
The investment  equation  suggests  that  external  shocks and the
control group dummy are insignificant  although  all other variables in the
equation have statistically  coefficients  with the expected signs.  Finally,
the inflation equation performed poorly.  None of the explanatory variables
had a significant impact on  inflation.  This is probably because we have
not included credit in  our  instrument  set.  However, in that equation,
external shocks has the right sign, i.e. external shocks push up inflation.
Our results also indicate  that  initial  conditions play a crucial
role in  affecting  the  macroeconomic  performance  of  the  economy.  For
instance, it is found that  a  higher  current  account surplus and a lower
inflation rate are associated  with  a  better investment performance in the
following period.  It is, however,  more difficult to understand why lagged
inflation should have  a  positive  effect  on  growth  and  on the current
account.13
To  summarize, against  the  background of  overall worsening
indicators  for  developing countries as  a  whole, after  controlling  for
external  factors,  IMF-WB  supported adjustment programs  appear  not to  have
significantly  affected  output  growth, nor  to  have  affected  the  level  or
efficiency  of investment. We  conclude that  the  evidence  on  whether  the
growth-oriented  adjustment programs of  the  eighties helped recipient
countries achieve higher  growth  and  improved efficiency is  still
inconclusive.  Given  that the  structural reforms advocated by these
programs  often  require  a relatively long  time  period  before  their  benefits
materialize,  the  above  results are  not  surprising.  However,  a  major
motivation  of the  adjustment  programs  was to  mobilize  resources,  that  is  to
increase  the  volume  of  investment  as  well  as to increase  its  efficiency
use.  Therefore, in  the  next  section we  analyze further aggregate
investment  behavior  over  a long  time period for  a group  of 15  countries
which  received  a relatively  large  number of  World  Bank loans  (usually  3  or
more).  In particular,  we  look  for  instability in the investment/output
relationship after the  inception  of  adjustment  lending  with  a view to
detect joint  changes  in  capacity  utilization  due  to stabilization and
changes in the productivity of capital due to reforms. 8/  We also estimate
output loss from investment  cuts during adjustment.
5.  Sustainability of  Adjustment:  Output  Loss  Estimates from Investment
Cuts for a Group of Intensive  Adjustment Lending Recipients
The previous results  suggest  that  the foundations for sustained
recovery were not acvieved primarily  due  to the fall in investment during
the adjustment lending period.  We  now  investigate further the issue of
long-term buqtainabillty  by  studying  aggregate  investment and aggregate14
output  during  adjustment for  a  group of  countries  which  were intensive
recipients  of IMF-WB  adjustment.  9/  We use  a simple  aggregate  growth  model
in  which  the  only  binding factor on  output  is  capital,  a simplification
which  allows  us to  extend the  analysis to  a larger  number  of countries
because  data requirements  are  few,  and  to  a  period  of 25  years. Labor .s
assumed  to  be in  abundant  supply. Foreign  exchange  may  be scarce,  but  lack
of its  availability  is,  as  in  Taylor  (1979),  fully  reflected  in (lower)
investment.  As derived  in  the  appendix,  the  estimated  equation  is:
(5)  Qt =  (1-X)  Qt-l +  a It +  vt
where  Qt =  output produced during t
X  =  depreciation rate
a  =  output capital ratio
It =  investment  during period t
vt =  error  term
This formulation  eliminates the  need  to depend on unreliable and
incomplete  data on employment.  It  also implicitly assumes that during the
estimation period, capital stock resources  were fully utilized except for a
stochastic term.  Since this assumption  is less tenable for the adjustment
years, initial estimation  is  carried  out  for the pre-adjustment period.
Stability testing (see table  A3) is  then used to assess whether the sample
period can be extended up until 1986.  In addition we test whether Qt-l is
correlated with the error term and for possible endogeneity of It.  Details
of the estimation procedure are described in the appendix.i  5
rta.e 4;  irE  fRGV'U(&J'N  FUNCTION
-75  J/  IT2  Stability  Period of  Bi-aMi
(l-X)  a  D75 d/  2  (1)  c/  Estimation  Year
Ch;l  / (2)  .83  .64  .36  .94  U  82-81  81
(7.89)  (2.34)  (2.8)
Colombia (2)  .89  .53  1.0  S  8d-85  84
(8.79)  (.92)
Ghana (4)  .82  .2S  .71  S  61-86  81
(7.68)  (.78)
Jamaica (8)  .84  .36  .94  S  61-88  SC
(18.94)  (3.13)
C2te d'Ivoire (3)  .89  .32  .98  U  88-79  79
(fixed) b/)  (20.31)  (2.27)
Kenya (3)  .96  .24  .99  S  88-88  81
(29.8)  (1.88)
Korea  (3)  .84  .60  1.0  S  el-88  So
(8.50)  (2.48)
4aiawi  (4)  .94  .28  .99  U  61-80  80
(32.56)  2.  91)
4exico  (2)  .79  .83  1.0  U  62-81  81
(8.22)  (2.93)
Vorocco (3)  .96  29  S9  S  81-86  82
(17.53)  (1.47)
Pakistan (4)  .97  .84  1.0  S  81-88  79
(26.13)  (2.88)
Philippines  (3)  .90  .45  1.0  U  81-79  79
(5.90)  (1.14)
Thailand  (2)  .9e  .37  1.0  S  81-86  81
(64.7)  (4.85)
Zambia  (3)  .90  0o  .92  S  61-8B  83
(16.94)  (1.09)
Notes:  t-statistics in parenthes,s
a/  Number of  SALs and  SECALS  n :aSertress.
b/  For all countries, gross domestic  neestmert  was  used for It ksee  eqat  rn 5)  except.
for  CSte d'Ivoire where fixed  nvestment was  sed.
/  S:  stable equation (the break year is pr  or to the first Bank  adj.s  "e't  carn)
U: unstable equation.
d,'  Dummy variable equal to 1  .or  the  year !975  ard  zero  ctherw.se.16
Estimation  results and  estimation periods appear  in  table  4.
Column  (2)  gives  the  estimate of  one  minus  the  depreciation  rate,  and
column  (3)  the inverse  of the  ICOR  (A). With  the  exception  of Zambia,  the
ranZe  of  estimated  values are  in  accordance  with a  priori  expectations,
althcugh  the  average  estimate  for  the  depreciation  rate (10?)  is somewhat
on the  high side. However.  our  interest  is  primarily  with the  estimate  of
the  ICOR  which  is  around  3 (excluding  outlier  Zambia). For  the  13 reported
countries,  the  values  of the  ICOR  lend themselves  to be separated  into  2
groups: countries  with  ICORs  above  3 (Kenya.  Ghana,  Malawi,  Morocco,  C5te
d'Ivoire) and  countries with  ICORs  below  3  (Thailand,  Philippines,
Colombia,  Chile, Korea, Jamaica, Mexico, Pakistan).  In  general,  the
composition  of each  group  fits  with a priori  expectations.
Stability  tests  (reported  in  the  appendix in table  A3) indicate
that  9 out  of 14  equations are  stable.  In interpreting  this  result,  it
should  be remembered  that  two  factors are likely  to affect  the  1COR  _uring
the  adjustment period:  ("l  changes in  capacity utilization due  to
stabilization;  and. .') changes in  the  productivity  of  _apita! ue tC
reforms  or  to  a  -hange in  the  public and  private sector shares  in
investment.  Because  these  two  effects  on the  ICOR  are indistinguishable  in
cur  model  and  because  they  are  likely  to  move in  opposite  directions  during
adlustment, it  is  nct surprising  that  stability  could not be rejected in
the  majority  of cases. Furthermore,  even  when  the  equation  was f,;end  to be
unstable,  the  fitted  value  of  cutput  based  on the  pre-adjustment  estimates
did  not  deviate  much  from  actual output  during  adjustment.  This suggests
that the net  effect  on  output  nf  changes  _n  capacity utili-at:cn and
capital  productivity was  not  significant.  Therefore.  instead,  w4e shai'
-cncent-atH  ;r.  .. easur`ng the ?xter.t  of  output loss due  tc lower  investmenr17
during  the  adjustment  period.  This  implies that  we cannot  evaluate,  as
intended,  whether adjustment lending raised the  marginal  efficiency  of
investments  through  reforms  in  the  system of  production  and  investment
incentives  for  the  private sector and,  for  the  public  sector,  through
rationalization  of public  investments,
To  estimate  the  output  loss  during  adjustment.  we estimated what
output would  have  been, had the  average investment-output  ratio  (I7Q)
between  1970 and  the  initiation  of  Bank adjustment lending  prevailed
afterwards.  Formally,  yearly  output  loss,  Lt, is  calculated  as:
.6)  Lt  a(t  t
*where  I  (I!Q) *  Q.,  and  a is  the  estimated  value  of  the output/capital
tI
ratio  from  equation  5 Ccolu;mn 2  of  table  4).  Notice  that  if cne  celieves
that  adjustment lending led to  higher  efficiency in resource use and thus
to a lower incremental  capital  output  ratio  (i.e.  a higher value of A),
then  equation  6 will  significantly  underestf.mate  the  output  loss  iue  to the
fall  in investment.
Table  5 gives  the  estimates of  the  contractionary  le,ss  on  -,ut.ut
due  to the  lower  investment  levels  during  the  period  of  adjustment  :
For  example,  Chile  lost ;7Z  of  output during 1982-6 tbecause  of  lower
investment  levels. Mexico,  Chile  and  Malawi  experien?ed  trhe  worst  losse
CDf course. one  ioannct  ascribe  the entire Output  loss  -o  the  ajustnent
relatively  -more  unfavorable  exterr.a  envircr-ment in  the early  cightie.
'.hile  and Mexico.  for  example,  had  tu  a'so adjus:  to  the  dlsequiL;  rA
resulting from  overly expansionary domestic policies  in the late seventies18
Table 5:  OUTPUT LOSS DUE TO LOWER INVESTMENT
IMF-WB
Average  Adjustment
Adjustment  Cumulative 2/  One-Year  Lending as
Country  Period 1/  Effect  Effect  Z of GDP 3/
1.  Chile  82-86  -.170  -.034  .010
2.  Colombia  85-85  -.004  - .004  .002
3.  Ghana  82-85  -.034  -.009  .025
4.  Jamaica  81-86  -.118  -.020  .031
5.  Cote  d'Ivoire  80-86  -.049  -.007  .019
6.  Kenya  82-86  -.141  -.028  .011
7.  Korea  81-86  .120  .020  .003
8.  Malawi  81-86  -.260  -.043  .033
9.  Mexico  82-86  -.230  -.046  .004
10.  Morocco  83-86  -.076  -.019  .013
11. Pakistan  80-86  -.053  -.008  .004
12. Philippines  80-86  -.097  -.014
13. Thailand  82-86  -. 083  -.017  .J04
14.  Zambia  84-86  -.037  -.012  .005
1/  The adjustment period is  defined  as  the  years after receipt of the
first Bank SAL.
e
2/  The formula used is E  a(It  - It)/QFt ; It =  [I)l
t=s  tQ
where:
[i) is the average of the  investment/output  ratio from 197' unti!
isthe  starting dates of the  ad4ustment program.
. =  the level  of investments.
QFt =  the  fitted value of output  (e.g.  5  where  it was replaced
by  It)
s  =  the starting date of the adjustment program.
e =  the last year available during  the adjustment program.
3/  Average IMF-WB lending on  average GDP over period 79-85.19
Only  Korea  raised  her  investment  ratio  during  adjustment,  thereby  showing  a
positive  output  gain.
Excluding  Korea  and  Zambia,  the  countries  fall  into  three  groups:
low,  medium,  and  high  output  loss as  a  percent  of GDP. Colombia,  Ghana,
Cote  d'Ivoire  and  Pakistan  lost,  on  average, less  than  one  percent  of GDP
per  year.  At  the  other  extreme, Mexico, Malawi, Chile,  and  Kenya,  on
average,  lost  close  to four  percent  of  GDP  per  year.  In interpreting  this
result, one  must  remember that  for  unstable countries (Cote  d'Ivoire,
Mexico,  Malawi,  and  Chile), the  estimate of the  output  loss  may  be biased
in  an unpredictable  direction  because  of a  change  in  the  value  of a  during
the  adjustment  period.
In spite  of these  caveats, our  results  suggest  a sizeable  output
loss  because  of  lower aggregate investment levels during  the  period  of
adjusti:nt  under  IMF-WB lending.  Since  an  objective of these  growth-
oriented programs was to r store  growth  by, among others, raising invest-
ment, one  must  ask  what  causes  this  sharp  decline  in investment and
resulting output loss.  While our analysis  does not allow us to measure by
how much private investment actually  fell, the estimated fall in aggregate
investment output ratios was large  enough in most countries t'9  leave little
doubt that private investment fell substantially during the adjustment.  At
least two factors  must have contributed to the fall in private investment.
The first factor is  that  the expenditure-switching policies that
accompanied the adjustment programs resulted in an increase in the relative
price of imported capital goods.  This cost increase was caused by the real
exchange rate devaluation required  to  achieve  a trade balance surplus to
service  the  external  debt.  Furthermore,  the  interpretation  of  the
statistical analysis of performance  indicators  in section 4 suggests that20
scarce  foreigrn  exchange was  probably tied  up in  purchasing  intermediate
goods  with little  left  for  capital  goods  imports.
But  this  interpretation  does not  tecognize that,  given  capital
investment  partially  irreversible  because of  sunken costs  of entry  and
exit,  the  decision to  invest in  the  activities supposedly  made  more
profitable  by the  ongoing  reforms depends on  the  probability  of a  policy
reversal  during  the  lifetime  of  the new investment.  With costly  resource
reallocation,  uncertainty  is likely  to  have  led  many private  investors  to
either  keep  their capital abroad or  in  existing activities  until  the
subjective  probability  that  the  reforms  and  adjustment  programs  will  not be
reversed  is  high  enough  for  them to  commit  to  new investments.  10/  Thus,
the  second  factor  would  ascribe  much  of  the  fall  in  private  investment  to
the  lack  of credibility  in  the  adjustment  programs,  perhaps  mostly  because
of the  size of  the  required adjustment,  or  perhaps also  because  of
overambitious reforms in an unsettled  macroeconomic environment.
6.  Conclusions
This paper  has  provided  a  statistical  analysis of performance
under IMF-WB growth-oriented adjustment  programs.  The evaluation was based
on a comparison of the average values of economic indicators during 1982-86
with the corresponding  average  values  during  1978-81.  The methodology
controlled for the state of the external environment during the period when
growth-oriented adjustment programs  were  in  effect  as  well  as for the
initial conditions of the loan recipient countries.  Account was also taken
of the policies that  would have  been  adopted had they not participated in
IMF-WB adjustment programs.21
Admittedly  the  methodology  is  crude, even  though  it  controls  for
most of the  pitfalls  common  in  such  comparative  exercises.  We found  that
initial  conditions  played a  significant  role in affecting  macroeconomic
performance. For  example,  we  found that  a higher  current  account  surplus
and  a  lower  inflation during 1978-81 were  associated  with  a  better
investment  performance  during  1982-86.  We also  found  that  a deterioration
in  the  external  environment  during  1982-86  was associated  with lower  growth
during  that  period.
The  main result  from  our  comparisons  between  IMF-WB  recipients  and
countries  that  did  not receive adjustment loans  (or  received  them  towards
the  end  of the  period  so that not  enough  time  had elapsed  to include  them
among  loan  recipients)  relate  to  growth  and investment.  After  controlling
for  initial  conditions  and  external factors, we  found no evidence  of  a
statistically  better  (or  worse) performance for  loan  recipient  countries.
These  results  suggest that  the  expected positive effects  on growth  and
resource  mobilization  expected  from  adjustment  with growth  packages  and  not
yet  occurred.  Given  that  the  structural reforms advocated by these
programs  often  require  a relatively long  time  period  before  their  benefits
materialize,  these  results  may  not  be surprising.
In the  last  section  of the  paper  we analyzed  in greater  detail  the
investment  output  relationship  for  a group of 14  countries  that  received  a
large  amount  of growth-oriented  adjustment lending.  For  each  country,  we
fit  a simple  production  function (in which  capital  is the  only  constraint
on  growth)  over  a 25  year period.  We  then  provided  an estimate  of the
output  loss  from  the  shortfall in  investment during  the  period  when each
country  was receiving  adjustment  lending.  The  results  show  much  foregone
growth  because  of lower aggregate (public and  private)  investment  levels22
during  the  period  of adjustment.  Thus,  the  desired  signs  of a sustainable
recovery  through  higher  investment,  evaluated here through  1986,  were  not
evident.23
Footnotes
1/  In  previous  work (Faini  et.  al.  1989),  we evaluated  performance  undet
adjustment  lending  for  a group of nine indicators  using  a before-and-
After  approach  so that  we  did  not  control  for  initial  conditions  nor
for  the  size  of external  shocks.
2/  The  World  Bank  initi-ated  SALS (structural  adjustment  loans)  and  SECALs
(sectoral  adjustment  loans)  in 1979 and  1981  respectively.  Like  the
EFF (Extended  Fund  Facility) and  stand-by arrargements,  World  Bank
adjustment  loans  are  quick  disbursing loans.  For  a  description  of
adjustment  lending  investments  by the  IMF  (World  Bank)  see  IMF  (1987),
World  Bank (1989). All  IMF  upper  credit  tranche  programs  are  of short
duration  and some Funid-supported  adjustment  programs  were initiated
before  1979. However,  of  288  programs during  1973-86,  only  44 took
place  during  1973-78.
3/  The following  model  draws  on  Goldstein  and  Montiel  (1986).
4/  Because  the  choice  of cut-off is  arbitrary, we also  carried  out  our
estimation using 1981 as  an  alte:native  cut-off point.  The results
were s.milar to those reported in table 3.
5/  The formula  derives  from  a  two-period  maximization  by  firms and
households under  assumptions  of  perfect  competition and wage-price
flexibility.  See Dornbusch (1985,  pp. 354-6).
6/  One round of  exclusion  tests  results  in  about  5  percent loss of
observations.  Excluded  countries  are  reported  in  the appendix in
Table A.2.  The  exclusion  criteria  were  determined by the value of
Cook's D-statistic.  See Belsley,  Kuh  and Welsch (1980),  and section
A.3.
7/  Similar results,  not reported  here,  were  obtained in an alternative
estimation based on a model in  which CON is replaced by the intensity
of IMF-WB adjustment lending.
8/  Because we fit  the  growth  model  to  a  relatively  large number of
countries,  we kept it as simple  as  possible so that  we were not able
to distingu_sh between capacity  and  productivity effects nor between
private and public investment.
9/  The 14 countries (see  Table  4)  were  selected  on  the basis of the
number of SALs.  Turkey,  included  in  that sample, had to be dropped
from our analysis  because  regime  changes  did  not  allow us to get
stable estimates.
10/  This  interpretation  is  emphasized in  a  broader context in  the
literature  on credibility  (Calvo,  1986;  Dornbusch  1988;  Rodrik,  1988).24
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Appendix
1.  Data Sources
All data were extracted from the  World Bank's BESD and ANDREX data
bases except the SAL and SECAL  flows  which were extracted from  World Bank
publications.  Data in constant  dollars  were  obtained by using the World
Bank's atlas  exchange  rate  conversion  factor.  In  the calculation of
external shocks (equation  4),  terms  of  trade  indices  were obtained by
dividing current exports and imports (expressed in dollars) by the constant
values.  Similar results  were obtained when the terms-of-trade indices  were
calculated from current an,i constant  local  currency values from National
Accounts data.
To calculate th.e effective  interest  rate  on  external debt,  we
applied LIBOR +  1  to  the  share  of  total  non-concessional debt and the
implicit interest rate from  interest  payments  on concessional debt.  For
Bank-Funding (BF)  we  constructed  two  variables;  one  based on gross IMF
credit (results in table 1); another in the net IMF credit where IMF credit
was calculated as IMF purchases less  IMF repurchases.  In both cases, Bank
SAL credits are the sum of SAL +  SECAL commitments.  We did not report the
results based on the net  TMF  credit definition because they are extremely
close to those obtained with gross credit.
As mentioned in the text,  we also experimented with a formulation
in  which we replaced the dummy  control  group variable CON in equation (3)
with a measure of the  intensity  of  IMF-WB  credit.  In those regressions
(not reported in the text because they  were similar  with those discussed in
section 4), the  measure of IMF-W-B  lending intensity is the average IMF +  WB28
credit (SAL  +  SECAL) during  1982-86,  expressed as a percentage of average
GDP during 1982-86.
2.  Sample
Table A.1 lists the 93  countries  in  the sample along with their
classification.  The control group, denoted  by C, includes 41 countries of
which 6 countries received  adjustment  lending  in  1986, the last year of
available data and 3 which received  their first adjustment credit in 1984.
A'll  other  countries  received  IMF  and/or  World  Bank adjustment credits
between 1982 and  1984.  Of  the  50  countries which received adjustment
credits during this period,  2v. countries initiated their first adjustment
credit in 1982 and 24 irn  1983.
3.  Excluded Countries  Trc.  7atle A.:
"he  -ntro.  grou  is tI  e group  of cou.ntr  es tha  JA  _,o  r  e_
:.ar.  eitr.er  :r;.  r;r  ear.k  ar  rrc  the  Fun<;d  in an  art  er  1  2.  EX_'  s
criterla we-e  onased  o.  the  -. ethod  octl  ned  in  Eelslee, :K,  and  n  iel  a.h
;1433,  hap.  2'  tested  only  e  r  irnfluernt  al  ?  rvat  c  r,s,  .
outliers.  We 7ert  rored  one  round  of  excLusions  based orn  roe fol  Lowiniz
statistic:
(n - p)  hi - (ln)  ] / (1 - hi)  (  p  - )  Fp  ,  - p
whe  re
n  =  number of  observations
p  =  rnm.ber of exp.anatory  variables
=  i th diiagonal'  elemnnt of  the  projection matrix.29
Table A.1:  93 COUNTRIES IN SAMPLE
Nation  'lation
(F,B)  ArgentinA  (F,B)  Morocco
C  Burundi  (F,B)  Madagascar
C  Benin  (F,B)  Mexico
F  Bangladesh  F  Mali
C  Bolivia  C  Malta
(F,B)  Brazil  C  Mauritania
F  Barbados  (F,B)  Mauritius
C  Burma  (F,B)  Malawi
C  Botswana  C  Malaysia
(F,B)  Central African Republic  (F,B)  Niger
(F,B)  Chile  B  Nigeria
C  China  C  Nicaragua
(F,B)  C6te d'Ivoire  C  Nepal
C  Cameroon  (F,B)  Pakistan
C  Congo  (F,B)  Panama
B  Colombia  F  Peru
(F,B)  Costa Rica  (F,B)  Philippines
C  Cyprus  C  Papua New Guirea
F  Dominican Republic  F  Portugal
C  Algeria  C  Raraguay
(F,B)  Ecuador  _  a
C  Egypt  -
C  Ethiopia  J',B  Se  &gat
C  Fiji  _  n  a  e
Gabon  '-a
(F,B)  Ghana
C  Guinea  'S  m  -
Gambia
B  Guinea-Bissau  S  ,
C  Greece
F  Guatemala
C  Guyana  -




C  Burkina  Paso  r
C  I  donesia
F  India  C  Z- 
C  Israel
(F,B)  Jamaica
C  Jordan  (F,B"  's  V  i
(F,B)  Kenya
(F,B)  Korea  (F,B  e
F  Liberia  $F,Ba
F  Sri  Lanka  (F.B)  BI-
C  Lesotho
N4otes- F,B denote  IMF  an'  'WB loan, rec±pients  respe:;.-el;  d.r -. *.e
period 1982-84.30
Table  A.2:  COUNTRIES  EXCLUOED  FROM  PERFORMANCE  REGRESSIONS
EQUATION  GDPK  GDIGDP  INF  CAGDP
LIST  OF  Bolivia  Mali  Lesotho  Paraguay
EXCLUDED  Burea  Sierra  Leone  Sierra  Leone  Sierra  Leone
COUNTRIES  Israel  Tanzania
Turkey31
For  p  >  10  and  n - p >  50,  the  value  of the  F  at 95Z  confidence  level  is
less  than  2 and  hence  2  p/n  is  a good  rough  cut-off. We took  into  account
two  criteria: (a)  no more than 5Z of the  observations  should  be excluded:
and (b)  exclude  observations  for  which  hi >  2 p/n.
Table  Al lists  the  93  countries  in  the  sample. Table  A2 gives  the
list  of influential  observations  excluded  from  each  equation.
4.  Production  Function  Estimation
Estimation  of the  production function relied on  a strategy  to
detect  the  presence  of correlation  of  Qt-l  with the  error  term  and to  check
for  endogeneity  of It.  An  instrumental  variable  (IV)  method,  described
below,  was  used if  either  Qt-l  or It  were found  to be endogenous.
Under the assumption that capital (Kt) is the only binding factor,
output (Qt)  can be written as Qt =  aKt + Ut where ut is a stochastic term.
Lag the expression for Qt by  one period, multiply the resulting expression
for Qt-l by one minus the depreciation rate X, then subtract (l-X)Qt.l from
Qt.  Using the capital stock identity  yields  equation 5 in the text.  The
model draws on Dadkhah and Zahedi (1986).
The error term in eq. 5  vt  is equal to ut-(l-X)vtil.  Therefore,
unless the error term ut  follows a first-order  autoregressive process with
parameter p=l-X. OLS estimation  will  yield inconsistent estimates because
of correlation of Qt-l with the error term.  The possible endogeneity of It
in (5)  may also result in inconsistent estimates.  This led us to adopt the
following estimation strategy.
First,  we  estimated  (5)  by  OLS  for  the  fourteen  countries
performing the Lagrange multiplier  (LM)  test for autocorrelation to check
whether one can assume that p=l-X.  In  the case of a significant value of32
the  LM test,  an  instrumental  variable  (IV)  procedure  was used  with It-1  and
domestic  credit  as instruments  for  Qt-l.  In the  case  where  endogeneity  of
It-,  was detected  alone with  autocorrelation,  we  used  It-2  and  domestic
credit  as instruments for Qt-l  Table A.3  gives  the  precise  set  of
instruments  used in  each  equation estimated by  IV.  Finally,  in  checking
for  endogeneity  of It.  we used the  Hausman  (1978)  test  on OLS  equations  and
the  Sargan  (1958)  test  on  the instrumental  variable  equations.
To sum  up,  we used  OLS  if  neither Qt-l nor It  were shown  to be
endogenous.  An instrumental  variables technique  was used  otherwise,  with
the  set  of  instruments  depending  on  which  variable was  detected
endogenously, (Qt-l and/or It),  and  on  the  eventual presence of
autocorrelation.
To test  for  stability we  used both  the  Chow  and  the  Hendry
procedures  for  OLS  estimates, and  we  relied on  the  modified  Chow test
(Kiviet, 1985) in the context  of  IV  estimation.  In  deciding  whether  an
equation  was stable or  not,  we  allowed  for  the  fact  that  the  power  of  the
Chow  test  may  be  fairly  low,  while  the  actual  size of the Hendry test  may
exceed its nominal size by a very large factor (Kiviet, 1986).33
Tablo  A.3
Estimation  LU2  Chow  Hendry  Sargan  Godfrey  Set  of
Technique  (X  1)  instruments
IV  Chile  13.6  .28(XI)  008  B
(.02)  (.9(X)
IV  Colombia  1.31  1109(X.)  .09  A
(.26)  (.30)
OLS  Ghana  .08  .08  1.33  1.35
(.78)  (.30)  (.8S)
OLS  Jamaica  .02  .02  .74  .94
(.89)  (.54)  (.82)
OLS  Cote  d'Ivolre  2.06  2.06  4.48  5.67
(fixed)  (.15)  (.01)  (.68)
OLS  Kenya  .18  .18  .49  3.36
(.67)  (.78)  (.64)
OLS  Korea  (1)  9.51  9.61  1.98  4.80
(.002)  (.13)  (.67)
OLS  Malawi  .48  .48  2.69  3.08
(.49)  (.05)  (.80)
IV  Mexico  17.18  22.4(XI1)  2.24  D
(.004)  (.13)
IV  Morocco  7.3  4.03(Xi)  4.03  C
(12.2)  (.04)
OLS  Pakistan  1.89  1.69  1.61  2.90
(.19)  (.23)  (.89)
IV  Philippinos  19.2  O(Xf)  0  A
(.01)  (.99)
OLS  Thailand  1.39  1.39  .84  1.42
(.24)  (.64)  (.92)
OLS  Zambia  2.24  2.24  .11  .11
(.09)  (.99)  (1.0)
A:  I,  I(-1),  DC  C:  I(-1),  DC,  Q(-2)
8:  I,  I(-I),  Q(-2)  D:  I(-I),  DC,  DC(-I),  Q(-2)
For  tho  definition  of  the  variabloe  see section  A.4.
(1)  Tho  LV is  quite  high  for  Koroa  which  indicatos  tho  presence  of  autocorrelation.  Normally,  the
IV  tochnique  would  havo  boon  employod  but  did  not  give  reasonable  estimate.  Hence,  OLS
estimat..  are reported.
Significance  level  for  chi-squared  statistic:
2  2 X2  = 3.84  X  2=6.63
1,a  =  o0  1,a  =  .01
2  2 X2  = 6.99  X  =  9.21
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